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INTRODUCTION
On September 14, 2004, brothers Seneca and Tari Adams endured
vicious beatings by Chicago police officers outside of their home. 1
Seneca Adams was initially stopped by Chicago police officers while
jogging through his apartment complex. 2 His neighbors looked on as
he was kicked, handcuffed, and punched in the face. 3 Later, he was
driven to a secluded area where an officer continued to beat him. 4
Having realized that the police car was driving in the opposite
direction of the police station, Seneca’s brother, Tari, followed the
vehicle. 5 He too was beaten and handcuffed. 6 The brothers were found
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2017, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
Adams v. City of Chicago, 798 F.3d 539, 541 (7th Cir. 2015).
2
Adams v. City of Chicago, 62 F. Supp. 3d 771, 773-74 (N.D. Ill. 2014),
vacated and remanded, 798 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. 2015).
3
Adams, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 773-74.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 774.
6
Id. at 775.
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guilty of misdemeanors and remained in custody at the Cook County
Jail for 204, and 46 days, respectively. 7
In 2006, the brothers sued. 8 The City of Chicago admitted liability
as to false arrest, use of excessive force, discrimination on the basis of
race, and malicious prosecution. 9 Although the jury awarded Seneca
and Tari compensatory damages at trial, the brothers were denied the
actual amount of damages that the jury intended. 10 Through a
procedure called “remittitur,” the trial judge’s determination that the
damages amounts were “grossly excessive” caused the award to be
reduced by over half. 11 The brothers never agreed to the reduction in
damages and were not offered the option of a new trial. 12 Under these
circumstances, the brothers were denied justice. Years later in 2015,
the trial judge’s order of remittitur was vacated by the Seventh Circuit
in Adams v. City of Chicago. 13
The Adams’ story is one of many instances of brutality and
targeting of minorities by law enforcement officers. This nation is
currently engaged in vigorous discussion about whether the courts
may be seen as a true avenue for justice in police brutality cases. Over
the last few years, failure to prosecute law enforcement officers for
racially motivated violence has caused public outcry. However, the
lesser-known procedural obstacle of remittitur has become a vehicle
through which civil rights plaintiffs may be denied fairness in court.
In some cases, even where liability is admitted as to raciallytargeted policing, a court may significantly reduce the amount of
damages awarded by a jury to victims of police brutality. Although the
Seventh Amendment provides that “no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States,” 14 courts have
7

Id.
Id. at 776.
9
Id. at 776-77.
10
Adams, 798 F.3d at 541.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 546.
14
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
8
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insisted that remittitur is applied only where a jury verdict is excessive
as a matter of law. This distinction is tenuous in a civil rights context.
Damages awarded by a jury to compensate for pain and suffering or
emotional distress involve a subjective determination of fact. Due to
the nature of such damages, the trial judge’s conclusion that a damages
award is excessive will necessarily involve some reexamination of
fact. Thus, this paper argues that in civil rights cases, the judge has no
constitutional or public policy basis for supplanting the jury’s
determination with a subjective conclusion about damages of his or
her own.
Further, although a “true remittitur” must be accompanied by the
alternative option of submitting the case to a new trial, recent
scholarship suggests that this option is illusory due to the increased
cost, delay, and risk associated with a new trial. 15 While the Seventh
Circuit reinstated the jury damages in the Adams brothers’ case, it
failed to take seriously the brothers’ argument that even a “true” order
of remittitur violates the plaintiff’s rights under the Seventh
Amendment. 16 Through an analysis of the trial option and the process
by which a judge determines that a jury award is excessive in civil
cases, this paper argues that the practice of remittitur serves no
constitutional or public policy interest when a plaintiff sues for
violation of his or her civil rights.
REMITTITUR IN FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCE
A. What is Remittitur?
Remittitur is defined as “the procedure by which a trial judge
gives a plaintiff who has received an excessively favorable jury verdict
the option of accepting a specified reduction in the jury verdict or

15

See Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under
the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731 (2003).
16
Adams, 798 F.3d at 546.
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submitting to a new trial.” 17 An order for remittitur most often occurs
after a losing defendant moves for a new trial on the ground that the
damages awarded by the jury were excessive. 18 Thus, the first step is
an initial determination by the trial judge that the jury verdict was
excessive. 19 On this question, jurisdictions have adopted differing
standards, resulting in confusion and lack of uniformity. 20
If the judge concludes that the jury verdict is excessive, he or she
may enter an order for remittitur that entitles the defendant to a new
trial only if the plaintiff refuses to accept a reduction in the jury
verdict. 21 A “true remittitur” is always accompanied by the alternative
option of a submitting the case to a new trial. 22 Specifically in a civil
rights context, there are few clear guidelines as to deciding how much
a jury verdict should be remitted. “There are no standard awards for
items such as pain and suffering or damage to reputation, and in
determining the amount to be remitted, the trial judge must adhere to
the vague standards required by the court of appeals for his circuit.” 23
Most circuits employ a “reasonable jury” standard that seeks to
determine the amount that would have been awarded by a reasonable
jury. 24 In making such a determination, the trial judge must balance the
interests of the plaintiff, the interests of the defendant, public policy
arguments, and constitutional law under the Seventh Amendment. 25
If a plaintiff accepts the reduction in his or her damages, final
judgment is entered on the reduced amount. 26 In this circumstance,
17

Irene Sann, Remittitur Practice in the Federal Courts, 76 COLUM. L. REV.
299, 302 (1976), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1530&
context=lawfaculty.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 303.
21
Id. at 304.
22
Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 482-83 (1934).
23
Sann, supra note 18, at 307.
24
Id.at 307.
25
Id. at 309, 312.
26
Id. at 311.
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although a defendant may appeal the trial court’s judgment, a plaintiff
has “traditionally been precluded from appeal on the theory that, by
choice, he has acquiesced in the final judgment on remittitur.” 27 If the
plaintiff chooses the alternative option of submitting to a new trial, he
or she must wait until final judgment has been entered on the second
trial before obtaining the right to appeal. 28 However, the judicial
system does not look favorably upon plaintiffs who refuse to remit. 29
As explained by Irene Johnson in her 1976 article “Remittitur Practice
in Federal Courts”:
[A]ppellate courts… seem quite hostile to plaintiffs who
refuse to remit. A court will hold that a remittitur from, for
example, $50,000 to $30,000 was not an abuse of discretion
since a reasonable jury might find that amount. In the next
breath the appellate court will decide that it was not an abuse
of discretion for the judge at the second trial to affirm a
verdict of $5,000 and deny plaintiff's motion for a new trial. 30
Thus, in most cases remittitur presents a no-win situation for
plaintiffs. As discussed infra, a lack of clear and uniform standards for
determining that a jury verdict is excessive, accompanied by the
illusoriness of the option for a new trial, cause an order for remittitur
to coerce a plaintiff into accepting reduced damages, even in situations
where a reasonable jury might have awarded the initial amount.
B. History of Remittitur in Federal Courts
The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according
27

Id.
Id. at 312.
29
Id.
30
Id.
28
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to the rules of the common law.” 31 The United States Supreme Court
has never directly addressed the question of whether remittitur violates
the Seventh Amendment. However, dicta found in the 1935 case
Dimick v. Scheidt, combined with long-term practice of remittitur in
federal courts, has allowed the procedure to occur largely without
question. 32
In Dimick, the Court considered the constitutionality of additur, a
procedure by which the trial judge increases the size of the jury
award. 33 Parallels between additur and remittitur caused the Court to
also discuss the constitutionality of remittitur against the Seventh
Amendment. 34 The action in that case involved negligent operation of
an automobile on a public highway. 35 At trial, the jury awarded the
respondent $500 in damages. 36 The respondent moved for a new trial
on the grounds that the damages were inadequate. 37 In response, the
trial court conditioned a new trial upon the petitioner’s refusal to
consent to an increase of the damages to $1,500. 38 The petitioner
consented to the increase and the respondent’s motion was denied. 39
The respondent appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the
judgment, holding that that the trial court’s order violated the
petitioner’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. 40 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in order to determine whether an order of
additur, which conditions a new trial upon a party’s refusal to consent
to increased damages, violated the Seventh Amendment. 41

31

U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
Dimick, 293 U.S. 482.
33
Id. at 476.
34
Id. at 482.
35
Id. at 475-76.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 475-476
32
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The Court found that “[i]n order to ascertain the scope and
meaning of the Seventh Amendment, resort must be had to the
appropriate rules of the common law established at the time of the
adoption of that constitutional provision in 1791.” 42 The Court
concluded that at English Common Law in 1971, there was “some
practice . . . in respect of decreasing damages,” but there was no
similar practice of increasing the amount of damages awarded by a
jury. 43 Thus, the Court held that trial court’s order of additur violated
the respondent’s right to a trial by jury as guaranteed by the Seventh
Amendment. 44
Dicta in the majority opinion grudgingly found that the practice of
remittitur was constitutional under the Seventh Amendment. 45 Writing
for the majority, Justice Sutherland reviewed the history of remittitur
in the American judicial system. 46 Remittitur first appeared in the
1822 circuit court decision Blunt v. Little. 47 There, a jury awarded the
plaintiff $2,000 in damages for malicious prosecution. 48 Finding the
damages excessive, Justice Story offered the plaintiff an option to
remit $500 of the damages or submit to a new trial. 49 His decision
rested upon a conclusion that remittitur was commonly practiced at the
time that the Seventh Amendment was adopted. 50
Commenting on Blunt and subsequent cases, the Dimick Court
noted it was “remarkable that in none of these cases was there any real
attempt to ascertain the common-law rule on the subject.” 51 In its brief
analysis of remittitur at English common law, the Dimick Court found
42

Id. at 476 (citing Thompson v. State of Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898);
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930)).
43
Dimick, 293 U.S. at 482.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 484.
47
Id. at 482-83.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 483.
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very little evidence to support Justice Story’s proposition that
remittitur was commonly performed at the time that the Seventh
Amendment was adoption. 52 Rather, the Court stated:
[T]he sole support for the decisions of this court and that of
Mr. Justice Story, so far as they are pertinent to cases like that
now in hand, must rest upon the practice of some of the
English judges—a practice which has been condemned as
opposed to the principles of the common law by every
reasoned English decision, both before and after the adoption
of the Federal Constitution, which [the Court has] been able
to find. 53
Therefore, the Court recognized that the constitutional basis for the
practice of remittitur was, at best, tenuous. 54 Justice Sutherland wrote,
“it . . . may be that, if the question of remittitur were now before us for
the first time, it would be decided otherwise.” 55 Without the requisite
historical evidence to support use of remittitur in the American judicial
system, it seems that the Court’s reasoning in Dimick invites an
inference that remittitur does not comport with the Seventh
Amendment.
Such reasoning conflicts with the court’s ultimate conclusion that
remittitur is constitutional. 56 Despite Justice Sutherland’s hesitance,
the Court found a basis for the practice of remittitur due to its common
use in federal courts. 57 This conclusion is inconsistent with the Court’s
emphasis on the importance of the jury as a fact-finding body. It is
curious that the Court endorsed the practice of remittitur in the same
decision as it declared trial by jury to be the “normal and preferable

52

Id.
Id. at 484.
54
Id. at 484-85
55
Id.
56
Id. at 482.
57
Id. at 484-85.
53
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mode of disposing of issues of fact.” 58 Thus, the Dimick opinion does
not preclude discussion about the constitutionality of remittitur in the
federal judicial system. On the contrary, the opinion involved
conflicting perspectives on the practice of remittitur in federal courts.
Years later, in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., the
Supreme Court considered whether an appellate court’s review of the
size of a jury verdict violated the Seventh Amendment. 59 In that case,
the petitioner, a journalist, sued the respondent for losing the
petitioner’s photographic work. 60 The petitioner had supplied 300 slide
transparencies to the respondent for use in an educational videotape. 61
The respondent used 110 of the petitioner’s transparencies but failed to
return the transparencies after completion of its videotape project. 62
The respondent conceded liability for the lost transparencies, and the
issue of damages was tried before a jury. 63 At trial, the jury awarded
the petitioner $45,000 in compensatory damages. 64
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit concluded that that the jury award was excessive because it
“deviat[ed] materially from what would be reasonable
compensation.” 65 Relying on a New York statute that empowered
appellate courts to review the size of jury verdicts, 66 the Second
Circuit vacated the $45,000 verdict and ordered a new trial, unless the
petitioner agreed to an award of $100,000. 67 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider whether the Seventh Amendment
58

Id. at 485-86 (“Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such
importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any
seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost
care.”).
59
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
60
Id. at 419.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 420.
65
Id.
66
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law and Rules (CPLR) § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995).
67
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 421.
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prohibited a federal appellate court from reviewing the size of a jury
verdict. 68
In its consideration of the Seventh Amendment’s re-examination
clause, the Court adopted an evolving interpretation of common law. 69
The Court upheld the appellate court’s use of the “deviates materially”
standard. 70 In so doing, the Court rejected the petitioner’s argument
that allowing an appellate court to determine excessiveness of
damages was incompatible with the Seventh Amendment. 71
Dimick and Gasperini make clear that a proper analysis of the
constitutionality of remittitur under the Seventh Amendment must look
to the English common law in 1791. 72 Dimick and Gasperini diverge,
however, in the respective approaches taken by the Court towards
interpreting the common law for the purpose of evaluating an
excessive damages practice today. In Dimick, the Court adopted a
static interpretation of the Seventh Amendment that determined its
scope as within the common law practice of 1791. 73 Four dissenting
justices in Gasperini also maintained this approach. 74 However, the
majority in Gasperini adopted a view of the common law as
evolving. 75 An evolving approach focuses the inquiry on whether an
excessive damages practice “maintain[s] the role of the jury as factfinder, at minimum, as it functioned at English common law in
1791.” 76
Even under an evolving interpretation of the Seventh Amendment
adopted by the Court in Gasperini, remittitur does not comport with
the Seventh Amendment because it “effectively eliminates the
68

Id. at 422.
Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the
Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 761 (2003).
70
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 417.
71
Id.
72
See id. at 446; Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
73
Thomas, supra note 15, at 751.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
69
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plaintiff’s right to have damages determined by a jury.” 77 As discussed
infra, because the trial option does not present a meaningful choice, an
order for remittitur forces the plaintiff to “take the judge-remitted
verdict or settle the case based on the judge’s determination.” 78 On the
question of constitutionality, remittitur fares even worse under a static
approach to the Seventh Amendment, as adopted by the Court in
Dimick. 79 Lack of historical evidence that remittitur was a common
English practice in 1791 suggests that remittitur does not comport with
public policy or a plaintiff’s constitutional guarantee that the “right of
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.” 80
SEVENTH CIRCUIT STANDARDS FOR REMITTITUR
A. Considerations for Determining Whether a Jury Verdict is
Excessive
The Seventh Circuit determines the appropriateness of remittitur
based upon several considerations outlined in Thompson v. Memorial
Hospital of Carbondale.81 In that case, a plaintiff employee sued his
employer, a hospital, for alleged racial discrimination in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981.82
The jury ruled in the plaintiff’s favor, and awarded him $500,000. 83
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision
not to grant a remittitur. 84 The court stated that in determining whether
a verdict for compensatory damages warrants remittitur, a court should
77

Id. at 736.
Id.
79
Id. at 751.
80
Id.
81
Thompson v. Meml. Hosp. of Carbondale, 625 F.3d 394 (7th Cir. 2010).
82
Id. at 401.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 408.
78
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look to several factors, including: (1) whether the award is
“monstrously excessive”; (2) whether there is no rational connection
between the award and the evidence; and (3) whether the award is
roughly comparable to awards made in similar cases. 85 “A
monstrously excessive verdict is one that is a ‘product of passion and
prejudice.’” 86 The Seventh Circuit has determined that the
“monstrously excessive” and “rational connection” factors are “really
just two ways of describing the same inquiry: whether the jury verdict
was irrational.” 87
This standard is problematic because it necessarily involves a
judge’s subjective determination concerning what it means for a
damages award to be “monstrously excessive.” 88 Issues also arise
when a judge compares damages in cases that are in fact dissimilar. 89
In a civil rights context, compensatory damages are often awarded for
categories that are difficult to quantify, such as pain and suffering or
emotional distress. Through the process of remittitur, a trial judge
“necessarily reexamines facts to determine whether the particular sum
awarded by the jury in damages is excessive,” thereby violating the
Seventh Amendment. 90
B. Is the New Trial Option Illusory?

85

Id. (citing Marion County Coroner's Office v. E.E.O.C., 612 F.3d 924, 931
(7th Cir. 2010)).
86
Adams v. City of Chicago, 798 F.3d 539, 543 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Fleming
v. Cty. Of Kane, 898 F. 2d 553, 561 (7th Cir. 2010)).
87
Adams, 798 F.3d at 543; Harvey v. Office of Banks & Real Estate, 377 F. 3d
698, 713-14 (7th Cir. 2004); EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276,
1285 (7th Cir. 1995).
88
Thomas, supra note 15, at 738.
89
Id.
90
William H. Wagner, Procedures to Lessen Remittitur's Intrusion on the
Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial, 1979 Wash. U. L. Q. 639, 643 (1979),
Available at: http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss2/13.
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An order for remittitur is constitutional only if accompanied by
the alternative choice of submitting to a new trial. 91 This general
principle governs remittitur in both state and federal courts. 92
However, in many cases the trial option is not viable due to increased
cost, delay, and risk. 93 In her article, Re-Examining the
Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the Seventh Amendment, Suja A.
Thomas reports her finding that the trial option is illusory because it
does not present plaintiffs with a meaningful choice. 94
Thomas conducted a study of the 168 federal district court cases
reported on Westlaw in which a judge granted remittitur as an
alternative to a new trial, as of 2003. 95 Her findings indicate that a
plaintiff accepted remittitur in 71% of the cases, and settlement
occurred in 27% of the cases. 96 A plaintiff took the new trial in only
2% of the cases studied. 97 The findings were even more dramatic
when the pool of cases was narrowed to those that involved “uncertain
damages,” such as civil rights or emotional distress cases. 98 The
plaintiff accepted the remittitur or settled in 100% of these cases. 99
Thomas’s findings demonstrate that for many plaintiffs,
exercising the option to a new trial is simply not realistic. She argues
that even if a second jury awards damages that are similar or higher
than the first, a plaintiff has “every reason . . . to believe that the judge
will reduce the damages again,” 100 because “[t]he judge who presides
over the second trial will be the same judge who previously

91

Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 482-83 (1934).
Id.
93
Thomas, supra note 15, at 741-42.
94
Id. at 740.
95
Id. at 744
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 745.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 740.
92
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determined the remitted amount was the maximum award under the
facts.” 101
Further, if a plaintiff refuses to accept damages, he or she is
unable to appeal the trial court’s order for a new trial after the second
trail is completed. 102 At this point, the plaintiff is likely to have
incurred significant expenses in costs and attorney’s fees. 103 Thus, the
plaintiff is forced to accept a reduced damages award or settle with
significantly less bargaining power as a result of the judge’s order for
remittitur.
Because an appellate court may be hostile towards a plaintiff who
refuses to remit his or her damages, remittitur may be seen as a
“coercive device.” 104 “The plaintiff would like to keep his entire
verdict, but the risk and expense of a new trial are too high . . . the
plaintiff may reluctantly decide to remit rather than take the chance of
losing some or all of the remainder in the second trial.” 105 Without
meaningful choice, Thomas’ study makes a strong argument that the
trial option is illusory. 106 Thus, even where present, an order for
remittitur does not comport with the Seventh Amendment.
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN ADAMS V. CITY OF CHICAGO
In April 2015, the Seventh Circuit decided Adams v. City of
Chicago. 107 Although the Seventh Circuit has a longstanding history of
support for the remittitur procedure, the plaintiffs in Adams directly
challenged the constitutionality of remittitur as a violation of their
rights to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. 108 The Seventh
Circuit declined to address this facet of the plaintiffs’ claim, stating, “it
101

Id.
Sann, supra note 18, at 311.
103
Thomas, supra note 15, at 741-42.
104
Sann, supra note 18, at 312.
105
Id.
106
Thomas, supra note 15, at 744.
107
Adams v. City of Chicago, 798 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. 2015).
108
Id. at 546.
102
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would be bold indeed for a court of appeals to come to such a
conclusion, given what the Supreme Court has said on the topic.” 109
The Seventh Circuit’s decision presents an opportunity to re-examine
Supreme Court doctrine regarding remittitur, and specifically to
address the ramifications of remittitur in civil rights cases.
A. Facts
At approximately 8:00 p.m. on September 14, 2004, Seneca
Adams was arrested by Chicago police officers. 110 Seneca was stopped
while jogging through the apartment complex where he lived with his
twin sister, Sicara Adams. 111 The officers shouted racial slurs at
Seneca, pointed their pistols at him, and punched him in the face
several times in front of Seneca’s family and other spectators. 112 When
the officers drove Seneca away from the apartment complex, Seneca’s
sister, Sicara, and brother, Tari Adams, decided to follow in Tari’s
car. 113
At a secluded location, the police officers continued to beat
Seneca. 114 When the officers realized that they had been followed, a
police officer punched Tari in the face. 115 Sicara and Tari attempted to
leave the scene but were followed by a police car that slammed into
the driver’s side of Tari’s car. 116 Tari was arrested and beaten as he
tried to exit his car. 117
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Eventually, both brothers were taken to a local hospital. 118 Seneca
was charged with four counts of aggravated battery and unlawful use
of a deadly weapon. 119 Tari was charged with four counts of
aggravated assault and two counts of aggravated battery. 120 Both were
found guilty of misdemeanors at a bench trial in the Circuit Court of
Cook County. 121 The brothers remained in the custody of the Cook
County Jail for 204 days, and 46 days, respectively. 122 However, on
December 19, 2006, the charges against Seneca and Tari were vacated
and their records were expunged. 123
The brothers sued the City of Chicago and individual police
officers as a result of the vicious beatings and prolonged detentions
that they were forced to endure. 124 They filed a complaint in federal
court, invoking federal question jurisdiction for their claims under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and supplemental jurisdiction for their state
law claims. 125 The City agreed to admit liability to both Seneca and
Tari Adams for (1) false arrest, in violation of the Fourth Amendment;
(2) excessive force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (3)
discrimination on the basis of race, in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (4) malicious prosecution,
in violation of Illinois state law. 126 In exchange, the brothers dropped
their claims against the individual officers. 127
B. The District Court’s Holding
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The case proceeded to a jury trial on compensatory damages
against the City on February 18, 2014, wherein the jury awarded
Seneca $2,400,000 and Tari $1,000,000 in damages. 128 At this point,
however, something unexpected happened; the district court entered an
order for remittitur, reducing each award to $1,170,000 and $350,000,
respectively. 129 The brothers were forced to accept this reduction, as
they were not offered the option of a new trial. 130 They appealed this
order to the Seventh Circuit. 131
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Holding
Seneca and Tari argued that the district court’s order of remittitur
should be vacated because it violated their Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial. 132 They relied heavily upon the scholarship of Suja A.
Thomas, in which she proposes that the United States Supreme Court
has never directly addressed the constitutionality of remittitur, and that
in fact its interpretation of the Seventh Amendment as related to the
unconstitutionality of additur disfavors use of remittitur as well. 133
Although the Seventh Circuit held in the Adams brothers’ favor, it
dismissed this argument based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in
Dimick and others. 134
In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit first addressed why the
plaintiffs had appellate jurisdiction in this case. The court recognized
that generally, “a plaintiff who accepts a reduced award may not
appeal from the court’s decision to cut back on the jury’s verdict.” 135
Based upon this rule, the City argued that because the Adams brothers
accepted their reduced damages, they could not appeal the district
128

Adams v. City of Chicago, 798 F.3d 539, 541 (7th Cir. 2015).
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court’s order of remittitur. However, the Seventh Circuit recognized
that appellate jurisdiction was secure because the Adams brothers were
never offered the option of a new trial, as a “true remittitur order”
requires. 136 Once jurisdiction was decided, the question in the case
became what to do about the district court’s failure to provide the
Adams brothers with this option. 137
The Adams brothers asked the Court to reinstate the jury verdict,
while the City argued that the Adams brothers should not be allowed
to skip the step of having to choose between reduced damages and a
new trial. 138 Thus, the Seventh Circuit turned to an excessive damages
test. The test involves three factors, including: “whether (1) the award
is monstrously excessive; (2) there is no rational connection between
the award and the evidence, indicating that it is merely a product of the
jury's fevered imaginings or personal vendettas; and (3) whether the
award is roughly comparable to awards made in similar cases.” 139
The Seventh Circuit’s application of this test demonstrates the
level to which an order for remittitur is a subjective determination,
particularly in civil rights cases: “We have observed that the
‘monstrously excessive’ standard and the ‘rational connection’
standard are really just two ways of describing the same inquiry:
whether the jury verdict was irrational.” 140 In deciding a matter of fact,
remittitur effectively allows a judge’s subjective determination to
replace that of the jury’s, even where, as here, it cannot be
demonstrated that the judge is better equipped to make such a
determination. The Seventh Circuit further analogized the jury verdict
to the damages awards in past decisions, finding that the original
$2,400,000 awarded to Seneca and $1,000,000 awarded to Tari did not

136

Id.
Id. at 542.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 543 (citing G.G. v. Grindle, 665 F.3d 795, 798 (7th Cir. 2011)).
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deviate greatly from other similar cases. 141 In doing so, the Seventh
Circuit again represented why this type of standard may cause
inaccuracies: “The problem, well illustrated by the briefs in this case,
is that one can always find excessive force cases with verdicts at
different levels.” 142 In discussing previous cases, the Seventh Circuit
admitted that this type of evidence is “anecdotal . . . at best.” 143
Despite its recognition of the problems associated with the
“monstrously excessive” standard, the Seventh Circuit declined to
consider Plaintiffs’ argument that the practice of remittitur itself
violates the Seventh Amendment. 144 The Seventh Circuit’s opinion
inaccurately interpreted Justice Steven’s opinion in Gebser v. Lago
Vista Independent School District 145 and the majority opinion in
Dimick 146 as directly addressing, and affirming, the constitutionality of
remittitur.
D. The Adams Brothers’ Seventh Amendment Argument
In addition to arguments more specific to their case, the Adams
brothers asserted that the order of remittitur was unconstitutional
because it violated their right to a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment. 147 Relying on the scholarship of Suja A. Thomas, the
brothers argued that damages are a question of fact, properly
determined by the jury, which cannot be supplanted by a judge’s
personal opinion. 148 Their argument called into question current
standards for determining whether remittitur is unconstitutional as
141
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indeed for a court of appeals to come to such a conclusion, given what the Supreme
Court has said on the topic”).
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inapplicable and inappropriate to cases that involve determination of
“uncertain damages,” such as civil rights cases. 149 For example, the
reasoning advanced by the Adams brothers involved the ancillary
assumption that remittitur is unconstitutional because in most cases the
option for a new trial is illusory. 150 Thus, even if this option had been
provided to them, the remittitur order would not have been sufficient
to pass constitutional muster under the Seventh Amendment.
At common law, review of judgments was limited to questions of
law, not fact. 151 The Adams brothers advanced a simple and
straightforward argument: the trial judge should not have been
permitted to supplant the jury verdict with his own opinion. 152 They
asked that the Seventh Circuit vacate the district court’s remittitur and
order it to reinstate the initial jury verdict. 153
In Gasperini, the Supreme Court cited a Second Circuit opinion:
“We must give the benefit of every doubt to the judgment of the trial
judge; but surely there must be an upper limit, and whether that has
been surpassed is not a question of fact with respect to which
reasonable men may differ, but a question of law.” 154 This principle
served as the foundation of the City of Chicago’s case. The City
claimed that the district court did not err in its order of remittitur
because the damages awarded to Seneca and Tari were so excessive as
to present a question of law for the district court judge. 155
However, counsel for the Adams brothers disputed the application
of the same principle here, and to other civil rights cases involving

149

Id.
Id.
151
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 452 (1996) (“The writ
of error only lies upon matter of law arising upon the face of the proceedings; so that
no evidence is required to substantiate or support it”) (internal citations omitted).
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Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 13, Adams v. City of Chicago, 798
F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-2862), 2015 WL 1020418.
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Adams v. City of Chicago, 798 F.3d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 2015).
154
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 435 (quoting Dagnello v. Long Island R. Co., 289
F.2d 797, 806 (2d Cir., 1961)).
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Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 157, at 14.
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“uncertain damages” in general. 156 The reply brief for Seneca and Tari
Adams distinguishes Gasperini as a case in which the Supreme Court
“was analyzing hard numbers, an excess of which could arguably been
seen as unlawfully excessive.” 157 In Gasperini, the Supreme Court
considered a breach of contract case. 158 There, the defendant-appellee
lost transparency slides belonging to a photographer and was thus
unable to follow through on his agreement that the slides would be
given back to the photographer upon completion of the project for
which they were needed. 159 Unlike the emotional and psychological
damages involved in Adams, Gasperini considered only measurable
damages related to the value of the lost transparencies. 160
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Gasperini touches upon the
injustice that results from the failure to make such a distinction. 161
Concerned that the Gasperini holding would allow courts to reduce
jury verdicts without tangible evidence of the jury’s unlawfulness,
Justice Scalia turned to the purpose of the Seventh Amendment. 162 He
stated:
There is no small irony in the Court's declaration today that
appellate review of refusals to grant new trials for error of
fact is ‘a control necessary and proper to the fair
administration of justice.’ It is objections to precisely that sort
of “control” by federal appellate judges that gave birth to the
Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment. 163
Within the spirit of Justice Scalia’s argument is the Adams brothers’
argument that reduction of jury damages in a civil rights case without
156
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tangible evidence of the jury’s unlawfulness subverts the meaning and
purpose of the Seventh Amendment.
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit in Adams lamented the
imperfect application of the excessive damages standard to “uncertain”
damages cases, in which a subjective determination must be made
regarding damages as opposed to a number that may be generated by a
formula. 164 The Seventh Circuit stated that comparisons “amount to
anecdotal evidence at best.” 165 Nevertheless, the court compared
Adams to other excessive force cases in which compensatory damages
were awarded. 166
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Adams brings to the
fore concerns about whether a judge may determine that a damages
award in any civil rights case is truly excessive and thus warrants a
remittitur order. It seems that Justice Scalia’s concern that a jury
verdict should not be remitted without sufficient evidence of the jury’s
unlawfulness has manifested itself in this case. 167 The Seventh
Circuit’s opinion describes no evidence of legal error, mistake in jury
instruction, or statutory cap on the damages permitted at the trial court
level in this case. Indeed, current standards for remittitur that ask a
court to determine whether a damages award is “monstrously
excessive” by observing whether it is roughly comparable to other,
“similar” cases necessarily permit a judge to supplant the jury’s
determination with a subjective, “uncertain,” determination of his or
her own. This simply cannot be supported, as it goes against the rights
and privileges afforded a plaintiff by the Seventh Amendment.
Finally, Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Gasperini is
instructive as to the Court’s error in finding a basis for the practice of
remittitur solely in its longterm practice by federal courts. 168
Critiquing the majority decision that permitted an appellate court to
review the size of jury verdicts, Justice Scalia stated:
164
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Today, the Court overrules a longstanding and well-reasoned
line of precedent . . . One reason is given for overruling these
cases: that the Courts of Appeals have, for some time now,
decided to ignore them. Such unreasoned capitulation to the
nullification of what was long regarded as a core component
of the Bill of Rights- the Seventh Amendment’s prohibition
on appellate reexamination of civil jury awards- is wrong. 169
Although the facts of Gasperini differ from use of remittitur in Adams,
Justice Scalia’s assertion is equally applicable to reductions in
damages ordered by trial judges. A court should not be permitted to
circumvent the requirements of the Seventh Amendment simply
because courts have done so before. This harm is likely to occur in
“uncertain” damages situations, including cases that involve damages
incurred by police brutality. In this context especially, an order of
remittitur is unconstitutional unless substantiated by concrete evidence
related to mistake in jury instruction, a damages award that exceeds
some statutory cap on damages, or other legal error.
CONCLUSION
In order to provide a true legal remedy to victims of police
brutality, courts must abandon the procedural obstacles that prohibit
civil rights plaintiffs from obtaining justice. While dicta found in the
Supreme Court’s decision Dimick suggests that a constitutional basis
for remittitur may be found in its long-term practice by federal courts,
the Court’s reasoning failed to analyze remittitur in depth. 170 In light
of the fact that little evidence can be found of a historical practice of
remittitur in English common law in 1871, remittitur falls beyond the
scope of the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial. 171
Although the Seventh Circuit reversed the order of remittitur in
169
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Adams, by neglecting to consider the plaintiff’s Seventh Amendment
argument, the Seventh Circuit failed to issue a decision that would
prevent similar harm to future victims of police brutality. 172 The
Adams decision illustrates the tension between remittitur orders and
the Seventh Amendment.
Specifically in the context of cases involving “uncertain” damages
such as compensation for pain and suffering, a trial judge’s
determination that these damages are “excessive” as a matter of law
necessarily involves his or her reexamination of the facts. 173 The
“monstrously excessive” standard in use by the Seventh Circuit to
determine whether a jury verdict is excessive is unclear, and invites
the trial judge’s subjective determination about the size of an
acceptable damages award to supplant the determination of the jury.
Further, the trial option presented to plaintiffs as an alternative to
reduced damages is illusory. 174 Due to the increased cost, delay, and
risk of loss associated with a new trial, plaintiffs rarely exercise the
trial option when presented with an order for remittitur. 175 In addition,
an appellate court may look unfavorably upon a plaintiff who refuses
to remit his or her damages. 176 Therefore, the trial option does not
present a meaningful choice, but, rather, coerces a plaintiff to accept
reduced damages lest he or she lose the full sum at a new trial.
While the procedure of remittitur has thus far escaped public
attention, it provides a significant obstacle for victims of police
brutality and other “uncertain” damages that seek justice in court.
Remittitur serves no constitutional or public policy interest in civil
rights cases. Therefore, in cases in which a plaintiff sues for violation
of his or her civil rights, courts must abandon the practice of remittitur
in order to facilitate justice.
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